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ABSTRACT
Software-Defined eXchanges (SDXes) promise to improve
the inter-domain routing ecosystem through SDN deploy-
ment. Yet, the naïve deployment of SDN on the Internet
raises concerns about the correctness of the inter-domain
data-plane. By allowing operators to deflect traffic from
default BGP routes, SDN policies can create permanent
forwarding loops that are not visible to the control-plane.
We propose Prelude, a system for detecting SDN-
induced forwarding loops between SDXes with high ac-
curacy without leaking private routing information of
network operators. To achieve this, we leverage Secure
Multi-Party Computation (SMPC) techniques to build
a novel and general privacy-preserving primitive that
detects whether any subset of SDN rules might affect the
same portion of traffic without learning anything about
those rules. We then leverage this primitive as the main
building block of a distributed system tailored to detect
forwarding loops among any set of SDXes. We leverage
the particular nature of SDXes to further improve the
efficiency of our SMPC solution.
The number of valid SDN rules rejected by our solution
is 100x lower than previous privacy-preserving solutions,
and provides better privacy guarantees. Furthermore,
our solution naturally provides network operators with
some insights on the cost of the deflected paths.
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Network security; Cryptography; • Networks → Rout-
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1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, SDN has transformed the way network
operators design and manage networks by supporting
highly flexible and fine-grained network control [15]. Yet,
deploying SDN in practice is notoriously difficult [18] as
the co-existence with legacy devices and routing proto-
cols often leads to unpredictable behaviors.
One of the most notable examples of this phenomenon
has been observed by Birkner et al. [4] in the emerging
context of SDN-enabled Internet eXchange Points, called
Software-Defined eXchanges (SDXes) [13]. SDXes have
been deployed in production [2] and are currently being
tested by the largest IXPs worldwide. Yet, naïve deploy-
ment of such architectures comes with severe potential
Internet-wide performance degradation as the growing
number of SDXes may increase the chances of creating
inter-domain forwarding loops.
These unwanted forwarding behaviors stem from a
simple fact: there exists a mismatch between the routing
expressiveness of SDN and BGP, the de-facto standard
inter-domain routing protocol. SDN at SDXes can be
used to create deflections, i.e., forwarding decisions that
are explicitly inconsistent with the BGP forwarding de-
cisions. Although these have the purpose to optimize
traffic delivery, naïvely using them can ultimately pre-
vent BGP from guaranteeing loop-freedom. Given the
practical impossibility of replacing BGP in the short
term with a clean-slate routing protocol, SDXes must
be armed with tools for avoiding forwarding loops and
guaranteeing a safe (i.e., loop-free) forwarding behavior.
Challenges. Preserving the safety of Internet routing is a
fundamental yet complex problem that entails efficiently
detecting forwarding loops while preserving the privacy
of routing policies and any other information about
the economic relationships among the networks that is
deemed confidential [1, 7] (see more details from a recent
survey in [6]).
Our approach. We devise Prelude, a novel approach
to efficiently detecting forwarding loops that guarantees
a safe forwarding behavior across the Internet, and both
higher levels of privacy and lower rejection rate for safe
SDN policies (deflections) than state-of-the-art solutions.
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Prelude is built upon a simple yet powerful network
verification primitive, called Distinct-Match, that al-
lows any two networks to verify whether their SDN
rules overlap, i.e., the set of packets matched by the
conjunction of these rules is non-empty, without leaking
any information about the SDN rules. We leverage re-
cent advancements on Secure Multi-Party Computation
(SMPC) to evaluate functions in a privacy-preserving
way. To maximize efficiency, Prelude performs as little
computation as possible within the SMPC machinery.
Our contributions. The main contributions are:
∙ We analyze the impact of BGP deflections on Inter-
net routing and prove that BGP deflections com-
pliant with traditional yet incomplete customer-
provider relationships are loop-free.
∙ We design Distinct-Match, a general privacy-
preserving primitive that allows any two networks
to verify whether their SDN policies overlap.
∙ We devise and evaluate Prelude, a control-plane
that runs at the SDXes in parallel with BGP and
detects forwarding loops without leaking private
routing policies of the SDX members. We prove
Prelude identifies all forwarding loops involving
any two networks connected at two distinct SDXes
with zero false positives1 and show that it reduces
the number of false positives with more than two
SDXes over previous solutions.
Related work. The work closest to ours is SIDR [4],
which first observed the problem of SDN-induced for-
warding loops and discussed how to detect them while
preserving privacy at the cost of accepting high false
positive rates. Our solution takes inspiration from other
applications of SMPC for IXP Route Server design, such
as Sixpack [7], and the Internet-wide Route Server [1],
ultimately leading to almost zero false positives in de-
tecting forwarding loops. We do not rely on the SGX
technology as it constraints network operators to rely
on very specific hardware and its different and debated
level of security, discussed in more details in [7]. We
however consider SGX complementary to our solution.
Finally, VeriFlow [14] performs verification of SDN rules
in single-domain networks that do not require privacy.
2 ON IXPS AND DEFLECTIONS
In this section, we present a background on Internet
eXchange Points (IXPs), followed by a discussion on the
problems that arise from leveraging the expressiveness
of SDN rules to deflect traffic away from BGP paths, a
problem that was introduced in [4]. We then prove that
there exists a practically relevant class of deflections that
do not cause any forwarding loops.
1All proofs are in the full version of our paper [16].
Background on IXPs. IXPs are the high-speed intercon-
nection network infrastructures through which a mul-
titude of Autonomous Systems (ASes), called the IXP
members, physically interconnect to exchange traffic. Re-
cently, IXPs experienced a sharp growth in customer
base and higher volumes of traffic due to reduced path
latencies and lower transit costs, ultimately resulting
in the existence of over 800 IXPs around the world. At
the largest IXPs, hundreds of members exchange ever-
increasing volumes of traffic (in the order of 5 Tbps)
towards hundreds of thousands of IP prefix destinations.
Routing information at IXPs is exchanged through
BGP in the form of path routes towards IP destination
prefixes. Network operators specify how to rank, export,
and select the routes to be used for forwarding traffic
through BGP policies. To prevent persistent forwarding
loops (i.e., packets that are sent in a network cycle), BGP
uses a loop-avoidance mechanism. For the scope of this
paper, it is worth knowing that this mechanism works
as long as (i) a single route is used to forward traffic
and (ii) only this route is exported to other networks.2
IXPs are deemed as a hot spot for innovation [8, 13].
Some of the largest ones are today experimenting new
SDX architectures. SDXes aim at supporting advanced
use cases for both IXP members and IXP operators [8, 9]
without requiring any member to deploy SDN switches.
Members steer their incoming/outgoing traffic at the
SDX by configuring their SDN policies, which match
flows of traffic (based on Layer 2 to Layer 4 fields) and
apply specific actions (such as forwarding a packet to a
certain member) [13].
BGP deflections at SDXes. When IXP members in-
stall SDN policies at an SDX, the BGP loop-avoidance
assumptions may be violated, resulting in forwarding
loops [4]. In fact, to support advanced peering applica-
tions that need to steer traffic through different members
according to particular QoS requirements [13], SDN poli-
cies support routing expressiveness well beyond the IP
prefix destination level. Flows with the same IP prefix
destination may be matched by distinct SDN policies,
each with a different forwarding action (e.g., one policy
for HTTP traffic and the other one for SSH traffic). This
results in some (or all) traffic being deflected from its
intended BGP path.
An example of an SDN-induced forwarding loop is
shown in Fig. 1. Two networks 𝐴 and 𝐵 (𝑁 and 𝑀)
connect at SDX1 (SDX2). A network 𝑍 originates an IP
prefix to which all networks aim at sending traffic. Green
links represent BGP paths. BGP policies are such that
network 𝐴 steadily forwards traffic through path 𝐴 𝑁 𝑍
2Any stability aspect of the global Internet BGP policies is or-
thogonal to the scope of this paper. Also, past studies have shown
that popular BGP destinations are remarkably stable [17].
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Figure 1: Example inter-SDX network.
while 𝑀 uses 𝑀 𝐵 𝑍. Network 𝐵 and 𝑁 install two
SDN policies (depicted in red) to deflect their HTTP
traffic (i.e., TCP port 80) towards neighbors 𝐴 and 𝑀 ,
respectively (the order in which the rules are installed
is irrelevant to the creation of a forwarding loop). This
operation has a severe consequence: all HTTP traffic is
now forwarded through 𝐵, 𝐴, 𝑁 , 𝑀 , and back to 𝐵, a
forwarding loop!
Detecting deflection-induced loops is difficult as de-
flections are not propagated through BGP. Neither 𝐵
nor 𝑁 is aware of the BGP deflections installed by the
other and both believe the deflected path is loop-free.
The problem of detecting deflection-induced forward-
ing loops is further hindered by the fact that, to quote [4],
“[networks] are not keen on sharing detailed information
about their policies”. A recent survey [6] confirmed these
concerns. For this reason, solutions to detect forwarding
loops without disclosing routing policies have been highly
sought after in the recent past [1, 4, 7]. The most notable
one, i.e., SIDR [4], advocates for a system where SDX
members share with other SDXes information about the
possible sets of forwarding actions of all the SDN policies
affecting the same specific IP prefix without disclosing
the type of traffic (e.g., whether it is HTTP or SSH)
that is being deflected or, in other words, without shar-
ing the SDN match filters. This solution preserves the
privacy of the match part of the SDN policies at the
price of reporting non-existing forwarding loops (false
positives). For instance, if 𝐵’s and 𝑁 ’s deflections only
affect HTTP and SSH traffic, respectively, no forwarding
loop is created. In Sect. 4, we show that over one out of
four forwarding loops reported by SIDR are incorrect.
Our system aims to both accurately detect forwarding
loops and improve the privacy of the SDN policies.
Safe deflections exist! One may ask if it is possible to in-
stall BGP deflections in such a way that Internet routing
is loop-free without requiring any coordination among
ASes. It is well-known that when BGP policies are con-
figured according to traditional customer-provider eco-
nomic relationships, as defined by the well-known Gao-
Rexford conditions [11], Internet routing converges to a
loop-free forwarding state. We generalize this to include
BGP deflections created by SDN policies.
Theorem 2.1. If the BGP policies and deflections
satisfy the Gao-Rexford conditions, then the forwarding
state is loop-free.
Unfortunately, while Gao-Rexford conditions are of-
ten implemented in practice, there are still many excep-
tions to them such as partial transit relationships [12].
Moreover, customer-provider relationships are generally
confidential. Thus, we need ways to detect potential
forwarding loops before deflections are installed.
3 PRELUDE
We are now ready to discuss the system requirements
that an Internet loop-detection system should meet to
be of practical interest. We will then explain how we
carefully design Prelude to tackle the challenges of
satisfying such requirements and carry out loop detec-
tion in a distributed manner (Sect 3.1), and present
the privacy-preserving primitive Distinct-Match for
detecting overlaps of SDN rules (Sect 3.2).
System requirements. Based on the discussion from
Sect. 2, we argue that any mechanism for detecting
deflection-induced forwarding loops among SDXes should
satisfy the following four requirements: (i) safety, i.e.,
no packet is forwarded through a cycle, (ii) privacy,
i.e., SDN policies should be kept private to the largest
possible extent and only information that is strictly
necessary to ensuring the safety of routing or available
through BGP should be revealed, (iii) effectiveness, i.e.,
reject as few safe SDN policies as possible (ideally zero),
and (iv) performance, i.e., forwarding loops should be
detected as soon as possible. We make extensive use of
recent advances in computation over encrypted data (i.e.,
SMPC) to achieve these four properties.
Threat model. We rely on the curious-but-honest se-
curity model, in which an attacker aims to learn as
much information as possible about an SDX member’s
policies from the exchanged messages while adhering
to the agreed protocol. This assumption resonates well
in today’s IXP ecosystem [7] as SDX members already
trust their IXPs/SDXes for forwarding their traffic to the
intended destinations. An attacker is either an SDX op-
erator or an SDX member who wants to learn about the
SDX policies of a member of another SDX. We assume
that the attacker does not gain control of any two SDXes,
which are independent organizations. SDXes may learn
about the IP prefix destinations of SDN policies installed
at remote SDXes that deflect traffic through them but
nothing more (neither who installed them nor the type of
traffic involved). These privacy assumptions are stronger
than the ones defined in SIDR [4] as the actions of the
SDN policies are hidden from third parties.
Root-causes of forwarding loops. We observe that only
two types of operations can trigger a forwarding loop:
(i) installation/removal of an SDN policy or (ii) BGP up-
dates to the routing state (e.g. a path change/withdrawal).
Path
Verifier
Distinct-
Match
SDX
Controller
Installed
Rules
SDX member
BGP 
deflection
Figure 2: Prelude overview. When a request is received,
Prelude verifies the safety of the deflected path. If acti-
vation is allowed, the rule is saved in the local table.
3.1 Overview
Fig. 2 shows the high-level architecture of Prelude.
The path verifier. When a member of an SDX installs/
removes an SDN policy or there is a BGP update that
impacts a deflection, the member sends a request to the
SDX where the rule is being installed. This request is re-
ceived by the path-verifier running at the SDX connected
to the issuing member. The path-verifier is responsible
for determining which SDXes are traversed by a given
path and how a path would be deflected.
To function properly, the path-verifier relies on a prim-
itive called Distinct-Match. This primitive will indi-
cate whether two distinct SDN rules (or policies) affect
the same traffic. Through Distinct-Match, the SDX
can verify, for a given flow of packets and associated path,
if any other SDX along the path is deflecting the traffic.
If a deflection occurs, the system will verify whether we
are closing a loop. Distinct-Match is implemented in
a privacy-preserving way, and the SDX can verify the
traffic path without learning anything about the SDN
policies of the requesting member.
All SDXes contacted during the verification will record
the installation of a rule and notify the installing SDX
of future downstream changes in policies or BGP state.
Interactions with the SDX controller. Prelude inter-
acts with an SDX controller, which is responsible for
installing SDN policies. Prelude filters unsafe policies
before they get installed into the SDX forwarding tables.
Provable effectiveness guarantees. A common case is
to have just two SDXes announcing the same prefix and
potentially exchanging traffic with each other. In this
case, our system guarantees provable effectiveness, as
formalized in Theorem 3.1. If more than two SDXes are
involved, false positives can occur (more in Sect. 4).
Theorem 3.1. Prelude detects a forwarding loop be-
tween two ASes at two SDXes if and only if a forwarding
loop between the two ASes exists. Moreover, the mem-
bers’ SDN policies are not revealed neither among SDXes
or any unintended member.
Proof. The proof of the theorem is straightforward.
Similarly to [11], we model the network as a graph
𝐺 = 𝑉,𝐸 where each vertex in 𝑉 represents an AS
and each edge in 𝐸 represents a BGP session among two
ASes. We say that a directed edge 𝑢, 𝑣 is a customer-
to-provider (peer-to-peer) edge if 𝑢 is a customer (peer)
of 𝑣. Similarly, we say that a directed edge 𝑢, 𝑣 is a
provider-to-customer edge if 𝑢 is a provider of 𝑣. First,
observe that BGP routing is guaranteed to reach a sta-
ble state when the Gao-Rexford conditions hold [11].
This allows us to focus only on the existence of forward-
ing loops at the data-plane level. Observe that, when
Gao-Rexford conditions hold, each path is guaranteed
to be valley-free, i.e., each path consists of a sequence
of customer-to-provider edges, followed by possible one
peer-to-peer edge, possibly followed by a sequence of
provider-to-customer edges. Now, observe that any Gao-
Rexford compliant deflection cannot alter these sequence,
i.e., a deflection can modify the forwarding path but it
cannot alter the customer-to-provider, peer-to-peer, and
provider-to-customer composition. Hence, a forwarding
loop cannot arise, which proves the statement of the
theorem. □
Example. In the example topology from figure 1, suppose
that AS 𝐵 has already installed a policy 𝑟𝐵 at SDX1.
AS 𝑁 requests the installation of policy 𝑟𝑁 at SDX2,
using BGP path 𝑀 𝐵 𝑍. Upon reception of this request,
the path-verifier at SDX2 discovers the presence of SDX1
on the path. Distinct-Match is called to discover if
𝑟𝑁 conflicts with any policy at SDX1 (i.e. the set of
packets matched by the policies is non-empty). If that is
the case, SDX1 notifies SDX2 that the next deflection on
the deflected path is AS 𝑁 at SDX2. The loop between
SDX1 and SDX2 is detected, and the rule is rejected.
3.2 The Distinct-Match primitive
We assumed that the Distinct-Match primitive used
by the path-verifier to detect if two rules will affect the
same traffic can be implemented without revealing to that
SDX the rule identifying the traffic flow. We now provide
some essential background on SMPC, then describe the
specific rule representations and SMPC “circuits” we
used to efficiently implement Distinct-Match.
Secure Multi-Party Computation. SMPC is a crypto-
graphic technique that allows multiple parties to jointly
compute the outcome of a function f while keeping their
respective inputs (and outputs) private.
In our work, we rely on two well-established SMPC pro-
tocol implemented in the ABY [10] framework. The first
one is Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson (GMW), in which the
core idea is to evaluate the successive gates sequentially.
The second is the Yao’s garbled circuits protocol, which
relies on garbled truth tables for the circuit gates. Both
protocols have different performance behavior that are
discussed in Sect. 4.
𝑚1 𝑚2 𝑝1 𝑝2
𝑐 = 1 if disjoint bit, 0 otherwise
(a) Masked XOR
MUX
𝑣𝑖 𝑣𝑑
𝑑𝑖
𝑢𝑖
(b) Value mapper
Figure 3: SMPC boolean circuits of Distinct-Match.
In both protocols, the function f is represented as a
boolean circuit consisting of basic AND and NOT gates
that is jointly evaluated by two non-colluding entities.
The inputs to the circuit are XOR-encrypted before being
shared by the parties, thus ensuring perfect privacy. In
our model, each of the non-colluding SMPC entities
executing the protocol is an SDX.
Efficiency requires that the SMPC function be kept
as simple as possible to limit the number of rounds in
which entities need to exchange information. To main-
tain practical runtimes, we limited our use of SMPC to
overlap detection, as described next.
Distinct-Match SMPC execution. Consider SDX1, that
wants to verify whether a rule 𝑟𝐴 overlaps with a remote
rule 𝑟𝐵 installed at a remote SDX2. Each SDN policy
(or rule) is encoded as a string in which each bit has
three possible values: 1, 0 or 𝑥 (don’t care). Two rules
are said to be distinct or non-overlapping if there exists
a bit index such that one rule matches a 1 and the other
rule matches a 0. In SMPC, we model each rule 𝑟𝑖 as a
bit pattern 𝑝 and a bit mask 𝑚. In the mask, the 𝑖-th
bit 𝑚𝑖 is 1 if 𝑟𝑖 is different from 𝑥, 0 otherwise. In the
pattern, the 𝑖-th bit 𝑝𝑖 has the same value as 𝑟𝑖, unless
𝑟𝑖 is 𝑥, in which case it can be any value.
The SMPC execution consists of three phases: input
generation, circuit execution, and output reconstruction.
Each SMPC input consists of two shares obtained by
XOR-encoding the input with a random nonce: one share
is the random nonce and the other is the encoded string.
Without both shares, it is impossible to learn anything
about the actual input. Each SDX sends to the other
SDX only one share of the input.
Figure 3a shows the boolean circuit implementing the
SMPC function that compares the rules 𝑟1 and 𝑟2. For
each bit, this circuit returns 1 if the bits of the corre-
sponding index in each rule match 0, 1 or 1, 0, respec-
tively (i.e., if the rules are disjoint). We then connect all
the bits with an OR gate to return a single (encrypted)
bit for the comparison.
If the rules are non-distinct (i.e., some packets would
be matched by both rules), it means that the remote
SDX already has an active overlapping rule that would
deflect some traffic of the new SDN rule. In that case,
Number of rules Baseline
Delay 1 50 500 5000 5000
1 ms setup 2.75 12.6 94.5 1033 —online 4.63 10.2 30.5 151 2
10 ms setup 20.7 48.4 162 1086 —online 40.6 64.2 136 382 20
100 ms setup 201 408 1237 6061 —online 401 604 1395 2638 200
Table 1: Average computation time (in ms) for the com-
parisons. Blue (Green) cells use Yao (GMW).
the circuit returns the identifier of the next SDX in the
deflection path created by the rule installed at SDX2.
If the rules are distinct, a special value is returned as
illustrated in Figure 3b (𝑣𝑖 is the next-hop identifier for
rule 𝑖, and 𝑣𝑑 stands for “dummy”). The SDXes finally
exchange their shares and reconstruct the output.
To make the verification efficient, Distinct-Match
compares multiple (potentially thousands of) rules in
parallel and returns a set of all the next-hops created by
the active rules. The output of the circuit is randomly
and secretly shuffled to protect the remote SDX’s rules.
Section 4 explains the cost of using this primitive when
more than two SDXes are involved in a loop.
Implementation. We implemented and evaluated the
above boolean circuits using the ABY framework [10],
a C++ toolbox supporting various implementations of
SMPC. The circuits can be evaluated with either the
GMW or Yao’s garbled circuit protocol. Both protocols
return the same result, but have performance differences
that are discussed in Sect. 4.
Because the bottleneck for SMPC circuit evaluation
is the one-way communication delay (and not the local
computation), the queries to Distinct-Match are done
in parallel for each SDX — only successive deflections
need to be discovered sequentially. This means that the
cost to verify the safety of a new rule is equal to the cost
of the longest path in the deflection graph.
4 EVALUATION
We now assess the effectiveness of Prelude in terms
of its ability to correctly identify safe or unsafe SDN
policies. Prior to that, we show the results of our micro-
benchmarks for the Distinct-Match primitive in terms
of processing time for different number of rules, which is
the costliest part of our system. We finally expand our
evaluation to the performance of the whole system. We
also investigate how different types of BGP deflections
may affect the length of the routing paths.
Distinct-Match micro-benchmarks.We evaluate the per-
formance of Distinct-Match. In this micro-benchmark,
two SMPC entities jointly evaluate theDistinct-Match
circuit. One SMPC entity holds one single SDN rule and
the other holds a set of SDN rules. We study the perfor-
mance of our Distinct-Match implementations along
three different dimensions: (i) the time to evaluate the
SMPC circuit, (ii) the communication delay between the
two entities, and (iii) the size of the set of SDN rules.
We break down evaluation time by setup time, which is a
phase of SMPC computation that can be pre-computed
and depends only on the maximal number of possible
rules, and online time, which depends on the actual
inputs and directly affects the system reactiveness.
Table 1 shows the average execution time over 50 exe-
cutions of the Distinct-Match operation for different
communication delays and sizes of the set of rules. In
all experiments, we set the length of the rules to 13
bytes, which is sufficient to encode source/destination
IPv4/TCP addresses/ports. The baseline is 2 * 𝑅𝑇𝑇 ,
ignoring any local computation cost. Evaluating the cir-
cuit with Yao’s garbled circuit protocol (blue cells) is
more efficient for small numbers of rules but scales lin-
early in the number of rules. Using the GMW protocol
(green cells) scales logarithmically with the number of
rules and, depending on the delays, is more efficient
when we compare hundreds or thousands of rules at
once. We also observe that the online time is directly
proportional to the round-trip delay, clearly indicating
that the communication delay among the two SMPC
entities is the limiting factor that prevents achieving
even more performing SMPC executions.
Loop-detection effectiveness. We now compare the abil-
ity of Prelude to effectively installs as many SDN
policies as possible with SIDR [4], the state-of-the-art
mechanism. To evaluate it, we used the same simulation
technique from SIDR. The topology is built from the
CAIDA AS graph [5] augmented with the links from the
combined IXP dataset. It computes paths to 1000 ran-
domly selected AS destinations. Each of the 421 IXPs is
considered to be an SDX. Moreover, we assume that traf-
fic traverses an SDX if its path traverses two members
of that IXP one after the other.
Each SDX member generates between one and four
policies towards 20% of the other members (at most
50 members). Those policies are restricted to matching
the IP protocol (TCP or UDP) and a random source
or destination port. Unlike SIDR, we select the source
and destination port randomly. This represents the fact
that no rule will be present for the most commonly used
ports, as the policies for those are implemented through
BGP. This also avoids creating duplicate rules. As a
consequence, the number of created loop is significantly
lower and those loops are often more complex than those
considered in the SIDR evaluation. A policy from mem-
ber 𝐴 to member 𝐵 is applied to each route announced
by 𝐵.
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Figure 4: Fraction of correct rules rejected by various
approaches.
Figure 4 shows the results for three loop detection
systems: SIDR, Prelude, and a perfect knowledge ap-
proach based on path exploration without any privacy
restrictions, which we use as an ideal upper bound for
our approach. We look at a path exploration dimension
called path-threshold, which caps the maximum number
of deflections to be followed by a path exploration mech-
anism. We observe that the false positive rate of SIDR
in our setting (random ports) is at 28% while the false
positive rate of the perfect knowledge solution is 0%
(with a path-threshold of 13).
We observe that Prelude sharply reduces the number
of incorrectly detected loops when compared to the less
privacy-preserving SIDR. With a path-threshold of 6
SDXes, Prelude has only 8% of false positives, which
drops to 0.3% when the path-threshold is set to 13.
Path exploration performance. The time required for
verification is proportional to the number of SDXes tra-
versed by the deflected path and the Distinct-Match
execution time. While exploring the network hop-by-hop
is normally costly, real paths generally cross only a few
ASes [3], and similarly only cross a very limited number
of SDXes. We evaluated the number of SDXes crossed by
deflected paths and report the CDF in Figure 5. We con-
sider two classes of BGP deflections: Gao-Rexford (GR)
compliant ones [11] (blue solid line), i.e., an AS never de-
flects traffic to a provider if a customer route is available
and non-compliant ones (orange dashed line), chosen
randomly. We observe that GR conditions keeps the
number of SDXes in the path low (60% of the paths with
only two SDXes). Yet, GR conditions are deemed non
realistic in practice as exceptions may exist. The second
scenario represents a worst-case situation, where ASes
deflect traffic through any random route they learned,
resulting in higher path inflation. We observe that the
SIDR assumption about the presence of an SDX in a
path is an over-estimate on the number of traversed
SDXes. When only two SDXes are traversed by a de-
flected path, the verification cost is exactly equal to the
one of executing Distinct-Match.
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Figure 5: Number of SDXes in the deflected paths.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we aimed at reconciling SDXes with the
limited BGP routing expressiveness and ASes’ natural
desire for preserving the privacy of their business infor-
mation. We designed and implemented a general privacy-
preserving primitive for detecting overlaps among SDN
rules that can be executed in practical runtimes. We then
introduced Prelude, a framework that allows SDXes to
verify the safety of SDN policies while keeping those poli-
cies private. Finally, we investigated the impact of SDN
deflections on Internet routing, demonstrating positive
conditions for loop-free Internet routing
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A PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
Proof. We prove the theorem in both directions.
∙ (⇒) We first prove that if Prelude detects a for-
warding loop between two ASes at two different
SDXes, then a forwarding loop exists. Suppose,
by contradiction, that a forwarding loop exists
between two ASes at two different SDXes but Pre-
lude does not detect it. Let 𝜋 be the IP prefix
destination towards which the deflection is created.
Let 𝐷𝐹1 and 𝐷𝐹2 be the two deflections installed
at SDX1 by AS1 and SDX2 by AS2, respectively.
In order for a forwarding loop to exist between
AS1 and AS2, AS1 must deflect its traffic through
a BGP route that traverses AS2 and vice versa.
Moreover, the deflected rules must at least partially
overlap in order to create a forwarding loop be-
tween AS1 and AS1. Yet, if the two deflected rules
overlap, the Prelude detects this overlap and
forbid the installation of the rule, a contradiction.
∙ (⇐) We now prove that if there exists a forwarding
loop originated because of two BGP deflections
installed at two ASes at two different SDXes, then
Prelude detects it. Suppose, by contradiction,
that our system detects a forwarding loop but the
forwarding loop does not exist. If Prelude detects
a forwarding loop between two ASes, then it means
that the two deflection installed at the two SDXes
overlap for a certain header space of the traffic
destined to 𝜋. This means that the traffic belonging
to this overlap will be routed on a forwarding loop
between the two ASes, which is a contradiction.
By observing that Prelude never learn anything
about the policies of its members, the statement of the
theorem is proved. □
